Dear Subscriber,
The following important judgements are available for download at itatonline.org.
Sanjeev Lal vs. CIT (Supreme Court)
S. 2(47)/ 54: If an agreement to sell is entered into within the prescribed period, there is a transfer of some rights in favour of the vendee. Fact that sale deed could not be executed within the time limit owing to supervening problem is not a bar for s. 54 exemption
Consequences of execution of the agreement to sell are very clear and they are to the effect that the appellants could not have sold the property to someone else. In practical life, there are events when a person, even after executing an agreement to sell an immoveable property in favour of one person, tries to sell the property to another. In our opinion, such an act would not be in accordance with law because once an agreement to sell is executed in favour of one person, the said person gets a right to get the property transferred in his favour by filing a suit for specific performance and therefore, without hesitation we can say that some right, in respect of the said property, belonging to the appellants had been extinguished and some right had been created in favour of the vendee/transferee, when the agreement to sell had been executed. A right in respect of the capital asset, viz. the property in question had been transferred by the appellants in favour of the vendee/transferee on 27.12.2002. The sale deed could not be executed for the reason that the appellants had been prevented from dealing with the residential house by an order of a competent court, which they could not have violated. As held in Oxford University Press vs. CIT [(2001) 3 SCC 359] a purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Act should be given while considering a claim for exemption from tax and one can very well interpret the provisions of Section 54 read with Section 2(47) of the Act, i.e. definition of "transfer", which would enable the appellants to get the benefit under Section 54 of the Act
CIT vs. Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd (Supreme Court)
Dept's SLP against High Court's verdict that s. 40(a)(ia) disallowance applies only to amounts "payable" as of 31st March and not to amounts already "paid" during the year dismissed
In CIT vs. Vector Shipping Services (P) Ltd 357 ITR 642, the Allahabad High Court held that disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) applies only to amounts "payable" as of 31st March and not to amounts already "paid" during the year. The majority judgement in Merilyn Shipping 136 ITD 23 (SB) was approved. The department filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court. The said SLP has been dismissed by the Supreme Court in limine
Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd vs. DDIT (E) (Bombay High Court)
S. 147: Bald statement that assessee has failed to make a full & true disclosure of material facts not sufficient. Details must be given as to which fact was not disclosed
It is true that the reasons for initiating re-assessment proceedings do in fact state that there was a failure on the part of the Petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment. However, merely making this bald assertion was not enough. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. v/s R.B. Wadkar 268 ITR 332 it was held that the AO must disclose in the reasons as to which fact or material was not disclosed by the assessee fully and truly necessary for assessment of that assessment year, so as to establish the vital link between the reasons and evidence. On facts, there are no details given by the AO as to which fact or material was not disclosed by the Petitioner that led to it's income escaping assessment. There is merely a bald assertion in the reasons that there was a failure on the part of the Petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts without giving any details thereof. This being the case, the impugned notice is bad in law and on this ground alone the Petitioner is entitled to succeed in this Writ Petition
CIT vs. Saurabh Enterprises (Allahabad High Court)
S. 269SS/ 269T is not attracted to book entries not involving cash transactions
As the transactions of loans & advances were not cash transactions and were merely book entries by way of adjustment entries, there is no violation of Section 269SS/269T of the Act and no question of levy of penalty u/s 271D/ 271E.
GE Energy Parts Inc vs. ADIT (ITAT Delhi)
Rule 29 of the ITAT Rules: Law on admission of additional evidence explained
(ii) On the issue regarding existence of a PE, a factual finding is required to be recorded on the basis of evidence on record and, if the Tribunal considers that additional evidence is relevant to the fact in issue, which is existence or not of PE, then in order to advance the cause of justice, the additional evidence should be admitted. In order to enable the Tribunal to decide disputes before it in a lawful, fair and judicious manner, it necessarily is required to look into and consider such and other material having a direct nexus and bearing on the subject matter of the appeal. Merely because the Linkedin profiles was available in public domain and was not referred to by the AO the department cannot be prevented from bringing that information on record so as to arrive at the correct factual finding on the issue regarding PE. This cannot be said to be a case of inordinate delay because the AO had drawn an adverse inference on account of non-furnishing of information by assessee and when assessee is trying to take mileage out of its conduct, the department is bringing on record additional evidence in the form of linkedin profile of employees to demonstrate that the conclusion drawn by department was fully justified. All the cases relied upon by the assessee & CIT(DR) are with reference to additional evidence brought before the Tribunal for the first time by assessee. But none of the cases deals with a situation where the assessee withholds some information from the department and then claims that information relevant to the facts in issue should not be admitted. The inordinate delay theory cannot be invoked in a case where cause of justice will be defeated rather than being sub-served;
Jai Surgicals Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT Delhi)
Expl to s. 37: If the purpose of the expenditure is not an offense/ prohibited by law, fact that prior approval of the Govt. was not obtained cannot be basis of disallowance
The Explanation to s. 37(1) is a deeming provision and disallows expenditure incurred by an assessee for 'any purpose' which is either an offence or prohibited by law. The inquiry to determine the applicability or otherwise of the Explanation is restricted to ascertaining the purpose of the expenditure. In simple words, the investigation should be carried out to see the object and consideration for the expenditure incurred. If the purpose of the expenditure is neither to commit an offence nor is prohibited by any law, then there can be no question of disallowance. It means that the offence or prohibition under law should be judged with the 'purpose' of the expenditure on a standalone basis divorced from the fulfillment or otherwise of the procedural formalities attached with and necessary for the incurring of such expenditure. To put it in simple words, if the expenditure is otherwise lawful and neither amounts to offence nor is prohibited by law, but the procedural provisions attached for incurring it are not complied with, no doubt irregularity will creep in, but such irregularity would not make the expenditure itself as unlawful so as to be brought within the scope of the Explanation. On facts, the payment of job work charges is not an offence or prohibited by law. The fact that there was no prior approval from the Central Government u/s 297 of the Companies Act does not make the expenditure of job work charges disallowable (CIT vs. Dhanpat Rai & Sons (2014) 98 DTR (P&H) 209 distinguished)
Regards,
Editor,
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Latest:
Lodha Builders Pvt Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT Mumbai)
Though accepting/ repaying loans/ advances via journal entries contravenes s. 269SS & 269T, penalty cannot be levied if the transactions are bona fide & genuine. The time limit for penalty u/s 271D & 271E is governed by s. 275(1)(c) & not 275(1)(a)
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