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Thursday, January 17, 2013

Three Landmark Supreme Court Judgements On Depreciation, Mutuality And Undisclosed Income

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From: editor@itatonline.org <itatonline.org@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 9:22 AM

 

Dear Subscriber,

 

The following important judgements are available for download at itatonline.org.

I. C. D. S. Ltd vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

S. 32: A "Financier" satisfies the "ownership" & "user" test for depreciation

 

The assessee, a NBFC, bought vehicles and leased it out to its customers. The vehicles were registered in the names of the customers. The AO held that as the vehicles were registered in the names of the customers and were used by them, the assessee was not eligible for depreciation u/s 32 as it was not the "owner" of the vehicles nor had it "used" the vehicles for purposes of business. The CIT(A) & Tribunal allowed the assessee's claim. However, the High Court reversed the Tribunal on the ground that the assessee was only a "financier" and not the "owner" of the vehicles and so was not eligible to claim depreciation. On appeal by the assessee to the Supreme Court, HELD reversing the High Court:

 

(i) S. 32 requires that the asset must be "owned, wholly or partly, by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business". The Department's argument that the assessee is not the "owner" of the vehicles is not acceptable because the lease agreement specifically provided that the assessee was the exclusive owner of the vehicle at all points of time and that it was empowered to repossess the vehicle (and not merely recover money) if the lessee committed a default. At the conclusion of the lease period, the lessee was obliged to return the vehicle to the assessee. Also, the assessee had the right of inspection of the vehicle at all times. As the assessee has a right to retain the legal title of the vehicle against the rest of the world, it would be the owner of the vehicle in the eyes of law. The fact that at the end of the lease period, the ownership of the vehicle is transferred to the lessee at a nominal value not exceeding 1% of the original cost of the vehicle does not make a difference. Also the fact that the Motor Vehicles Act deems the lessee to be the "owner" has no relevance;

 

(ii) The Department's argument that the assessee had not "used" the vehicles is also not acceptable because the vehicle was "used" by the assessee in its' business of leasing. Once it is held that leasing out of the vehicles is one mode of doing business by the assessee and the income derived from leasing out is treated as business income it would be contradictory, in terms, to say that the vehicles are not used wholly for the purpose of the assessee's business. The physical user of the vehicles is not necessary (Shaan Finance 231 ITR 308 (SC) followed)

 

Contrast with IndusInd Bank Ltd 135 ITD 165 (Mum) (SB) where a distinction was drawn between a "Finance Lease" & an "Operating Lease" on the basis of Asea Brown Boveri vs. IFCI 154 TM 512 (SC) & Association of Leasing & Financial Services Companies v. UOI

M/s Bangalore Club vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

Interest earned by a mutual association from deposits placed with member banks is not exempt on the ground of "mutuality"

 

The assessee, a mutual association, claimed that the interest earned by it on fixed deposits kept with the bank (which was a corporate member) was not taxable on the basis of mutuality. The AO rejected the claim though the CIT(A) and Tribunal upheld the claim. The High Court reversed the Tribunal and upheld the stand of the AO. On appeal by the assessee to the Supreme Court, HELD dismissing the appeal:

 

For a receipt to be exempt on the principles of Mutuality, three conditions have to be satisfied. The first is that there must be a complete identity between the contributors and participators. The second is that the actions of the participators and contributors must be in furtherance of the mandate of the association. The third is that there must be no scope of profiteering by the contributors from a fund made by them which could only be expended or returned to themselves. On facts, though the interest was earned from banks which were corporate members of the club, it was not exempt on the ground of mutuality because (i) the arrangement lacks a complete identity between the contributors and participators. With the funds of the club, member banks engaged in commercial operations with third parties outside of the mutuality, rupturing the 'privity of mutuality', and consequently, violating the one to one identity between the contributors and participators, (ii) the surplus funds were not used in furtherance of the object of the club but were taken out of mutuality when the member banks placed the same at the disposal of third parties, thus, initiating an independent contract between the bank and the clients of the bank, a third party, not privy to the mutuality & (iii) The Banks generated revenue by paying a lower rate of interest to the assessee-club and loaning the funds to third parties. The interest accrued on the surplus deposited by the club like in the case of any other deposit made by an account holder with the bank. A façade of a club cannot be constructed over commercial transactions to avoid liability to tax. Such setups cannot be permitted to claim double benefit of mutuality.

 

Note: This impliedly approves Common Effluent Treatment Plant 328 ITR 362 (Bom) & Wellington Gymkhana Club 46 DTR 22 (Mad) while impliedly reversing Delhi Gymkhana Club 339 ITR 525 (Del)

ACIT vs. M/s A. R. Enterprises (Supreme Court)

S. 158B: Despite TDS & Advance-tax, income is "undisclosed" if ROI not filed by due date

 

A search u/s 132 was conducted on 23.2.1996 when it was detected that though the assessee had taxable income for AY 1995-96 it had not filed a ROI and the due date (31.10.1995) had lapsed. The AO issued a s. 158BD notice directing the assessee to file a return for the block period. The assessee claimed that as it had paid advance tax on the income for AY 1995-96, the income could not be said to be "undisclosed". The AO rejected the claim though the Tribunal and High Court accepted the assessee's claim on the basis that payment of Advance Tax itself necessarily implies disclosure of the income on which the advance is paid. On appeal by the department to the Supreme Court, HELD reversing the Tribunal and High Court:

 

S. 158B(b) defines the expression "undisclosed income" to mean that income "which has not been or would not have been disclosed for the purposes of this Act". The only way of disclosing income on the part of an assessee is through filing of a return and therefore an "undisclosed income" signifies income not stated in the return filed. It cannot be said that payment of Advance Tax by an assessee per se is tantamount to disclosure of total income. There can be no generic rule as to the significance of payment of Advance Tax in construing intention of disclosure of income. This depends on the time at which the search is conducted in relation to the due date for filing return. If the search is conducted after the expiry of the due date for filing return, payment of Advance Tax is irrelevant in construing the intention of the assessee to disclose income because it is a case where income has clearly not been disclosed. The possibility of the intention to disclose does not arise since the opportunity of disclosure has lapsed. If search is conducted prior to the due date for filing return, the opportunity to disclose income by filing a return still persists. In such a case, payment of Advance Tax may be a material fact for construing whether an assessee intended to disclose. An assessee is entitled to make the legitimate claim that even though the search or the documents recovered show income earned by him, he has paid Advance Tax for the relevant assessment year and has an opportunity to declare the total income, in the return of income, which he would file by the due date. Hence, the fulcrum of such a decision is the due date for filing of return of income vis-à-vis date of search. Also, because Advance Tax is based on estimated income, it cannot result in the disclosure of the total income assessable and chargeable to tax. The proposition that payment of Advance Tax is tantamount to disclosure of income would be contrary to the very purpose of filing of return. On facts, as the assessee had not filed the ROI by the date of search and the due date had lapsed, the income found was "undisclosed" even though advance-tax thereon had been paid. Similarly, as TDS is also computed on the estimated income of an assessee for the relevant FY, it does not amount to disclosure of income, nor does it indicate the intention to disclose income if the ROI is not filed.


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Regards,


Editor,


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